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Summary
The illumination of a scene strongly affects our perception
of objects in that scene, e.g., the pages of a book illuminated
by candlelight will appear quite yellow relative to other types
of artificial illuminants. Yet at the same time, the reader still
judges the pages as white, their surface color unaffected
by the interplay of paper and illuminant. It has been shown
empirically [1] that we can indeed report two quite different
interpretations of ‘‘color’’: one is dependent on the constant
surface spectral reflectance of an object (surface color) and
the other on the power of light of different wavelengths re-
flected from that object (reflected color). How then are these
two representations related? The common view, dating from
Aristotle, is that our experience of surface color is derived
from reflected color or, in more familiar terms, that color
perception follows from color sensation [2–4]. By definition,
color constancy requires that vision ‘‘discounts the illumi-
nant’’; thus, it seems reasonable that vision begins with
the color of objects as they naively appear and that we infer
from their appearances their surface color. Here, we ques-
tion this classic view. We use metacontrast-masked priming
and, by presenting the unseen prime and the visible mask
under different illuminants, dissociate two ways in which
the prime matched the mask: in surface color or in reflected
color. We find that priming of the mask occurs when
it matches the prime in surface color, not reflected color. It
follows that color perception can arise without prior color
sensation.Results
Experiment 1
The aim of this experiment was to determine whether the
color of an unseen object is represented in terms of its re-
flected color or its surface color. That is, can color constancy
be computed for an object that elicits no experience? Meta-
contrast masking [5], which extinguishes the experience of a
briefly presented stimulus through the use of a subsequent
mask, was used to render a colored prime invisible. Success
of this method depends upon the interstimulus delay, in addi-
tion to the spatial, temporal, and chromatic properties of the
stimuli. The color of the prime speeds color recognition of
the mask, but only when the prime and mask match in color.
In this experiment, the prime and mask were presented under
different illuminants, one resembling direct sunlight (Com-
mission Internationale de l’Eclairage [CIE] D50), and the other
resembling average daylight (CIE D65). Two mask colors were*Correspondence: liam.norman@durham.ac.uk (L.J.N.), robert.kentridge@
durham.ac.uk (R.W.K.)chosen so as to match either the prime’s surface color (blue
mask) or the prime’s reflected color (greenmask). See Figure 1,
Table S1 available online, and Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for information on chromaticities. Figure S1 illus-
trates the spectral properties of the two illuminants. All exper-
iments were covered by approval from the Durham University
Psychology Department Ethics Committee.
The experiment consisted of two separate phases. In the
first phase, the priming phase, participants completed three
sessions in which they identified the color of the mask as
quickly as possible. The prime was presented 50 ms before
the onset of the mask for durations of either 12.5 ms or
37.5 ms. The prime was absent in half of the trials, and we refer
to these trials as having a 0 ms prime presentation time. See
Figure 2 for an illustration of the sequence of events in a single
trial (see Figure 2 legend and Supplemental Experimental Pro-
cedures for details on how the illuminant was changed). We
quantified a single measure of the prime’s effect by taking
the difference between its effect on response times (RTs) for
masks matched in reflected color (measured relative to when
the prime is absent) and the samemeasure for masksmatched
in surface color. The resultant measure was the surface prim-
ing advantage (SPA), which, when positive, implies that the
color of the prime was congruent in terms of surface color
and, when negative, implies that it was congruent in reflected
color. The SPA was significantly above zero at both prime
duration levels (mean SPA = 25.8 ms for short prime duration,
and mean SPA = 31.4 ms for long prime duration; t(9) = 4.801,
p = 0.001 and t(9) = 5.120, p = 0.001, respectively). All results
are shown in Figure 3.
In the second phase of the experiment, the detection phase,
participants completed three sessions in which they judged
whether the prime was present or not on a confidence scale
of 1 to 8 (the nature of the prime was demonstrated to them
in a much slower presentation of stimuli prior to beginning
this phase). The discriminability index (da) was calculated us-
ing the software RScorePlus [6] to fit a Gaussian unequal-vari-
ance signal detection model to these data. Overall, da did not
differ significantly from zero for either level of prime duration
(mean da = 20.006 for short prime duration, and mean da =
0.186 for long prime duration; t(9) = 0.162, p = 0.875 and t(9) =
1.823, p = 0.102, respectively), which indicates very strongly
that participants had no experience of the prime. The individ-
ual signal detection results indicate that just two participants
could detect the presence of the long duration primes. No par-
ticipants were able to detect the short duration primes.
Experiment 2
This experiment tested whether the results can be explained
by participants learning to anticipate how surfaces under
D50 would appear under D65, given that observers attended
to a location that invariably underwent this illuminant change
on each trial. Such a strategy would be consistent with some
inferential theories of color constancy (see discussion in [7]).
Here, we eliminated the predictability of the illuminant
change; we randomly interwove trials with an illuminant
change with those in which the illuminant did not change.
Nevertheless, the SPA for illuminant-change trials remained
significantly above zero (mean SPA = 69.5 ms for short prime
duration, and mean SPA = 43.6 ms for long prime duration;
t(9) = 3.359, p = 0.008 and t(9) = 2.685, p = 0.025, respectively),
Figure 1. Chromaticities for the Blue and Green Surfaces
Chromaticities for the blue and green surfaces when illuminated by D50 or
D65, specified in CIE u0 v0 space. The blue and green filled dots in the plot
represent the chromaticities of the blue and green masks, respectively,
seen under D65. The crosses represent the same surfaces seen under
D50. The prime display is illuminated by D50, and the prime is identical in
chromaticity to that of the blue mask under the prime’s illuminant (sur-
face-color match) but is nonetheless physically identical to the green
mask in terms of reflected color (reflected-color match). See Figures S1
and S3 for further details and for modeling of the effects of adaptation to
the stimuli.
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da = 0.000 for short prime duration, and mean da = 0.159 for
long prime duration; t(9) = 0.007, p = 0.994 and t(9) = 1.479,
p = 0.173, respectively; two participants could detect the pres-
ence of the prime at the long duration). The priming effects are
unlikely to have arisen as a result of implicit learning.
Experiment 3
Here, we sought to eliminate the possibility that the priming ef-
fect was due to constancy of color contrast. The ratios of cone
excitations in response to light reflected from adjacent sur-
faces remain approximately constant across an illuminant
change [8]. In this study, the prime and mask appeared over
the intersection of four background squares, so there was no
single contrast to prime, lessening the probability that contrast
constancy explains color priming. However, to eliminate this
possibility, we added a dark chromatic annulus to both the
outer and inner edges of the mask in experiment 3, thereby
removing the common set of local contrasts shared between
prime and mask. The SPA was again significantly above zero
(mean SPA = 14.2 ms for short prime duration, and mean
SPA = 28.9 ms for long prime duration; t(9) = 2.467, p = 0.036
and t(9) = 5.186, p = 0.001, respectively), and participants’ da
did not differ significantly from zero (mean da = 20.057 for
short prime duration, and mean da = 0.038 for long prime
duration; t(9) = 1.193, p = 0.263 and t(9) = 0.737, p = 0.480,
respectively). Thus, the priming effect was not dependent on
equivalence in local contrast between the prime and mask.
Experiment 4
We have discussed the surface priming advantages observed
in experiments 1–3 in terms of constancy for surface color.
Constancy can, however, also affect judgments made about
reflected color [1, 9]. Adaptation in the retina that scales neural
responses in proportion to the prevailing strength of signalsfrom each cone class (von Kries adaptation) can affect all
cortically mediated responses to color. Can our results be ex-
plained in terms of such low-level mechanisms? In Arend and
Reeves’s [1] original experiments, participants adjusted the
color of one patch under one illuminant to match that of
another patch under a different illuminant in accordance with
the following instructions: (1) ‘‘make the samples look as if
cut from the same paper,’’ or (2) ‘‘make the samples match in
hue and saturation.’’ The first yields a large degree of con-
stancy, and we believe this instruction taps our ability to repre-
sent surface color, whereas the second yields a very small, but
nonetheless present, degree of constancy, which we believe
taps representations of reflected color. If low-level mecha-
nisms of constancy produced the priming effects in this study,
then they would lead to a degree of constancy in representa-
tions of the prime’s reflected color.
In experiment 4, we measured separate indices of con-
stancy for surface color and reflected color between the prime
and target by using unmasked primes (made visible by extend-
ing their presentation duration) to show that only the surface-
color constancy can explain the priming effect. On a scale
where 0.00 represents perfect inconstancy and 1.00 repre-
sents perfect constancy, the average degree of reflected-color
constancy did not differ significantly from zero (0.00; t(9) =
0.034, p = 0.973), whereas that of surface-color constancy
did (0.65; t(9) = 7.355, p < 0.001). This value of surface-color
constancy is consistent with that found in other experiments
(normal average of 0.66 [9]), but it is unusual to find a complete
absence of reflected-color constancy (normal average 0.23).
A control condition showed that this anomaly is the result
of presenting the prime and mask sequentially in the same
spatial location. When the prime and mask were presented
simultaneously but were spatially separated under different
illuminants, the degree of reflected-color constancy was 0.29
(t(9) = 5.499, p < 0.001). Together, thesemeasurements provide
strong evidence that the unseen prime was represented in
terms of its surface color and that the results of experiments
1–3 could not be explained in terms of retinal adaptation.
Retinal adaptation nevertheless often does affect constancy
for reflected-color judgments. Why does it not do so in our ex-
periments? Effects on reflected-color judgments are typically
found in experiments in which there is a wholesale change of
illumination across the visual scene. In our experiments, we
shift the boundary between two areas of illumination a small
distance and therefore havemuchweaker changes in the over-
all color of stimuli. We modeled how von Kries adaptation
would affect the signals elicited by the stimuli in our experi-
ments. Thesemodels suggested that retinal adaptation cannot
account for the findings of experiments 1–3 (the modeling
is described in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures;
Figure S3 and Table S2 illustrate the modeling results). The
similarity of color signals between the prime and mask should
determine priming. Even after adaptation, the modeled signals
from reflected-color masks are still more similar to primes than
those from surface-color masks.
Discussion
These experiments used a metacontrast-masked priming task
in which the prime and mask were presented under different
illuminants; we showed that an unseen prime speeds the
color recognition of the mask if they share surface color,
not reflected color. The priming effect did not result from
implicit learning across trials, i.e., from the acquired ability to
BA
Figure 2. Stimuli Presented in an Experimental Trial
(A) Experiment sequence. The sequence of an individual trial is shown, from left to right. An initial cue indicates the location of the prime and mask. After a
delay, the prime is then presented for a variable duration, either 0ms (prime absent), 12.5 ms, or 37.5 ms, and the duration of the following ‘‘Blank’’ display is
dependent on the duration of the prime in order for the prime mask stimulus onset asynchrony and the overall display duration to be kept constant across
conditions. During the presentation of the prime, the scene is illuminated in one half by D50 and in the other half by D65, with the illuminant boundary bisect-
ing the scene at an angle of 45. The prime always appears in the D50 half. After the offset of the prime and before the onset of the mask, the illuminant
boundary moves such that the target will appear under the D65 illuminant. The mask is shown in its two potential colors: the green is congruent with the
prime in reflected color, but the blue is congruent in surface color. Note that the figure is only an illustration of the stimuli—color and scale of stimuli are
not accurate.
(B) Mask with inner and outer border annuli. The dark chromatic annuli around the inner and outer regions of the mask annulus ensured that the mask and
prime colors did not share a common chromatic contrast with the background in experiment 3.
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2824anticipate the effects of the illuminant change on the
mask’s appearance (experiment 2). Also, the priming effect
was not explained by the constant chromatic contrasts of
the prime and mask with their checkerboard backgrounds
(experiment 3).
Previous studies have provided good evidence that at least
some aspect of color constancy is automatic and possibly
nonconscious. Barbur and Spang [10] showed that when we
have no conscious access to an illuminant change, color con-
stancy is not diminished, and Foster et al. [11] have demon-
strated that we detect violations in color constancy without
attentional scrutiny. The present study provides the first
strong evidence that the perception of surface color can occur
in the absence of prior color sensations, at least insofar as we
understand ‘‘color sensations’’ as the conscious experience of
(something akin to) reflected color.
This finding may appear to be at odds with a previous study
[12], which found that although a white prime was more easily
confused with a blue mask than a green mask, it acted as a
congruent prime for the green mask on the basis that it was
more similar in terms of the luminances of the RGB guns of
the monitor. Unlike in the present study, however, the prime
was not matched with the masks in either surface or reflected
color, so the priming effect might be driven by some other
stimulus attribute, such as color contrast (whose impact is
minimized in our experiments). To our knowledge, the presentstudy is the first to use a change in illuminant conditions in
order to dissociate surface and reflected color.
This study sheds light on the stage of processing in which
surface color is estimated. The anatomy of color vision shows
a clear progression from midget ganglion cells in the retina,
where neural responses are determined primarily by the
wavelength composition of light, to striate cortex, where cells
responding to wavelength [13] and wavelength contrast [14]
are found, and extrastriate areas that appear to compute color
constancy [15, 16]. One potential constancy mechanism relies
exclusively on rapid adaptation of photoreceptors in the retina
[17]. As indicated by the complete absence of constancy in
participants’ perception of reflected color under conditions
of the priming task (experiment 4), however, such adaptation
can be ruled out as an explanation of our results because
any mechanism operating prior to signals entering striate
cortex is certain to modulate our experience of reflected color
(or hue, saturation, and brightness).
Another mechanism, not based on local adaptation pro-
cesses and relying on spatial interactions, is extremely rapid
and likely to have a cortical basis [18]. This is likely to be asso-
ciated with color contrast cells in striate cortex [14, 19], which
could signal the stable property of relative surface color under
a changing illuminant given that cone excitation ratios be-
tween adjacent surfaces are invariant under such a change.
It is important to note, however, that the priming effect we
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Figure 3. Results
The left panel shows the mean surface priming advantage (SPA; upper panel) and sensitivity calculations for detecting primes at short and long durations.
The SPA is positive in all cases, indicating that the priming effect was driven by matches in surface color and not reflected color. In comparison, the sensi-
tivity indices (da) do not differ significantly from zero, indicating very strongly that participants had no experience of the prime. Error bars show61 SEM. The
middle and right panels show receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for each participant for detecting the prime at the short and long onset dura-
tions, respectively. ROC curves plot hit rate against false alarm rate across an individual’s criteria range. The ROC curves showing sensitivity at the long
onset durations (right panel) indicate that just two participants could detect the primes in experiments 1 and 2. In contrast, no participants could detect
the primes at the short onset duration in any experiment or at either duration in experiment 3. See also Figure S2 for separate RTs to blue and green masks
as a function of prime duration.
(A–D) Experiment 1 results.
(E–H) Experiment 2 results.
(I–L) Experiment 3 results.
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2825observed cannot simply be explained by priming at the level of
color contrast and is instead likely to necessitate a representa-
tion of surface color beyond that in striate cortex. Cells in mon-
key extrastriate area V4 modify their chromatic sensitivity in
accordance with changes in background color [20], and areas
in human cortex, including the fusiform gyrus, have been impli-
cated in similar roles [10, 21]. It is entirely plausible that the
unseen prime in the present task evoked such extrastriate
processing, given that masked unseen primes are known to
elicit activity in occipitotemporal areas [22]. Reduction in thevisibility of masked color primes by a metacontrast mask
probably occurs in early cortical areas V2 and V3 [23], but, pre-
sumably, the initial signal elicited by the primes can progress
beyond these areas.
In neuropsychology, it is clear that the neural bases of color
constancy and color experience are difficult to distinguish
[13]; in cases of cerebral achromatopsia [24, 25], wherein co-
lor experience is lost, there is also no measurable implicit
perception of surface color [26] and therefore no color con-
stancy. Indeed, in Zeki’s model of color perception, it is V4
Current Biology Vol 24 No 23
2826that is the site of both constancy and experience [16, 27], but
the two are nonetheless functionally separate, at least to the
extent in which experience remains intact while constancy is
impaired [16, 28]. The results from the present study suggest
that the reverse dissociation can hold: color constancy can
occur in the absence of color experience. One candidate
area for the neural correlate of color experience [29] lies ante-
rior to the constancy areas implicated in these studies,
and there is some controversy over whether any of the earlier
stages give rise to color experience [30], so one might spec-
ulate that estimates of surface color might feed into color
experience.
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